Scielo RSS http://www.scielo.org.bo/rss.php?pid=2074-470620040001&lang=en vol. num. 2 lang. en http://www.scielo.org.bo/img/en/fbpelogp.gif http://www.scielo.org.bo http://www.scielo.org.bo/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2074-47062004000100002&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en This paper tests whether Rodrik's (1999) results that institutions for conflict management are associated with the ability to react to economic shocks are robust to different ways of defining the quality of such institutions. In this paper, we measure the quality of conflict management institutions with two different indices. The first is an index of political constraints on the ability of the executive to impose its will. These constraints limit the ability of the government to arbitrarily change the rules of the game and therefore may reduce redistributive struggles. The second index measures the degree of political particularism. We define political particularism as the policymakers' ability to further their career by catering to narrow interests rather than broader national platforms. The indices used in this paper solve the endogeneity and subjectivity biases that affect Rodrik's main measure of institutional quality. We find strong support for the idea that high levels of political constraints and intermediate levels of political particularism are associated with a quick recovery from economic shocks. http://www.scielo.org.bo/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2074-47062004000100003&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en This paper builds on Freund and Weinhold (2000) to show that the results of that paper can be applied to the case of Bolivia. We review the implications of the Freund and Weinhold model, emphasizing the effects of the Internet on increasing trade and lessening the effects of historical trading patterns in determining trade flows. Specifically, using a gravity model of trade for 56 countries including Bolivia, we show that the Internet stimulates trade and that Bolivia stands to gain an economically significant benefit from increased Web connectivity. Our results imply that a 10 percent increase in the relative number of web hosts in Bolivia would have led to about 1 percent greater trade in 1998 and 1999. The evidence is consistent with a model in which the internet creates a global exchange for goods, thereby reducing market-specific sunk costs of exporting. http://www.scielo.org.bo/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2074-47062004000100004&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en The increase in Natural Gas sales to Brazil in the coming years will bring about substantial changes in the Bolivian economy. In this paper, we use a general equilibrium model to simulate the changes that will occur in the Bolivian economy and will consider the distributional impacts that are likely to arise from these economic changes. http://www.scielo.org.bo/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2074-47062004000100005&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing controversy on the distributional effects of structural reforms in developing countries. To this end, we set up a small-scale macroeconomic model of a dual economy to capture the transmission mechanisms through which the deregulation of product and factor markets, the liberalization of the trade and FDI regime, and the privatization of public companies impact on the distribution of employment and wages between the formal and the informal sector. We empirically test the implications of our theoretical model in a detailed case study on the structural reform process in Bolivia since 1985. http://www.scielo.org.bo/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2074-47062004000100006&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en In the 1980s, Ecuador began an expensive project providing primary irrigation canals to the Santa Elena Peninsula. The intended beneficiaries were the region's communal farmers. Instead, virtually all irrigable lands have been sold to large farmers and land speculators, usually at exceedingly low prices. While political and economic abuses explain some of these sales, introduction into a communal setting of an innovation which improved returns to capital relative to labor made land divestitures almost inevitable. With effectively no access to credit, communal farmers had little ability to invest in secondary irrigation systems. Moreover, because users of irrigable lands did not fully control communal sales decisions, as these lands became attractive to others, dispossession risks rose. The net result was that reservation prices for holding these lands fell among communal farmers at the same time of increased demands for these assets by those outside the comunas. Implications for development strategies are also discussed. http://www.scielo.org.bo/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2074-47062004000100007&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en In the 1980s, Ecuador began an expensive project providing primary irrigation canals to the Santa Elena Peninsula. The intended beneficiaries were the region's communal farmers. Instead, virtually all irrigable lands have been sold to large farmers and land speculators, usually at exceedingly low prices. While political and economic abuses explain some of these sales, introduction into a communal setting of an innovation which improved returns to capital relative to labor made land divestitures almost inevitable. With effectively no access to credit, communal farmers had little ability to invest in secondary irrigation systems. Moreover, because users of irrigable lands did not fully control communal sales decisions, as these lands became attractive to others, dispossession risks rose. The net result was that reservation prices for holding these lands fell among communal farmers at the same time of increased demands for these assets by those outside the comunas. Implications for development strategies are also discussed. http://www.scielo.org.bo/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2074-47062004000100008&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en In the 1980s, Ecuador began an expensive project providing primary irrigation canals to the Santa Elena Peninsula. The intended beneficiaries were the region's communal farmers. Instead, virtually all irrigable lands have been sold to large farmers and land speculators, usually at exceedingly low prices. While political and economic abuses explain some of these sales, introduction into a communal setting of an innovation which improved returns to capital relative to labor made land divestitures almost inevitable. With effectively no access to credit, communal farmers had little ability to invest in secondary irrigation systems. Moreover, because users of irrigable lands did not fully control communal sales decisions, as these lands became attractive to others, dispossession risks rose. The net result was that reservation prices for holding these lands fell among communal farmers at the same time of increased demands for these assets by those outside the comunas. Implications for development strategies are also discussed. http://www.scielo.org.bo/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2074-47062004000100009&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en In the 1980s, Ecuador began an expensive project providing primary irrigation canals to the Santa Elena Peninsula. The intended beneficiaries were the region's communal farmers. Instead, virtually all irrigable lands have been sold to large farmers and land speculators, usually at exceedingly low prices. While political and economic abuses explain some of these sales, introduction into a communal setting of an innovation which improved returns to capital relative to labor made land divestitures almost inevitable. With effectively no access to credit, communal farmers had little ability to invest in secondary irrigation systems. Moreover, because users of irrigable lands did not fully control communal sales decisions, as these lands became attractive to others, dispossession risks rose. The net result was that reservation prices for holding these lands fell among communal farmers at the same time of increased demands for these assets by those outside the comunas. Implications for development strategies are also discussed. http://www.scielo.org.bo/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2074-47062004000100010&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en In the 1980s, Ecuador began an expensive project providing primary irrigation canals to the Santa Elena Peninsula. The intended beneficiaries were the region's communal farmers. Instead, virtually all irrigable lands have been sold to large farmers and land speculators, usually at exceedingly low prices. While political and economic abuses explain some of these sales, introduction into a communal setting of an innovation which improved returns to capital relative to labor made land divestitures almost inevitable. With effectively no access to credit, communal farmers had little ability to invest in secondary irrigation systems. Moreover, because users of irrigable lands did not fully control communal sales decisions, as these lands became attractive to others, dispossession risks rose. The net result was that reservation prices for holding these lands fell among communal farmers at the same time of increased demands for these assets by those outside the comunas. Implications for development strategies are also discussed. http://www.scielo.org.bo/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S2074-47062004000100011&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=en In the 1980s, Ecuador began an expensive project providing primary irrigation canals to the Santa Elena Peninsula. The intended beneficiaries were the region's communal farmers. Instead, virtually all irrigable lands have been sold to large farmers and land speculators, usually at exceedingly low prices. While political and economic abuses explain some of these sales, introduction into a communal setting of an innovation which improved returns to capital relative to labor made land divestitures almost inevitable. With effectively no access to credit, communal farmers had little ability to invest in secondary irrigation systems. Moreover, because users of irrigable lands did not fully control communal sales decisions, as these lands became attractive to others, dispossession risks rose. The net result was that reservation prices for holding these lands fell among communal farmers at the same time of increased demands for these assets by those outside the comunas. Implications for development strategies are also discussed.