

EL ESTADO-LOGÍSTICO BRASILEÑO, EL MODELO DEL NUEVO-DESARROLLO Y LA ESTRATEGIA EUROPA 2020: UN ENFOQUE DE POLÍTICAS COMPARADAS

THE BRAZILIAN LOGISTIC-STATE, THE NEW-DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL, AND THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY. A COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICY APPROACH

Maria Ferreira [£]

- **RESUMEN:** Siguiendo un enfoque de política pública comparada, este artículo compara el modelo Brasileño del estado-logístico y el modelo del nuevo-desarrollo, introducidos por autores Latino-Americanos, con la Estrategia de la Unión Europea Europa 2020. El artículo desarrolla tres argumentos principales: (i) que puede establecerse una relación de commensurabilidad entre el modelo del estado-logístico, el modelo asociado del nuevo-desarrollo y la Estrategia Europa 2020; (ii) que el establecimiento de dicha relación debe tener en cuenta las distinciones entre Brazil y la Unión Europea que representan formas distintas de organización política; (iii) que la Estrategia de la Unión Europea Europa 2020 representa la Unión Europea y sus Estados-miembros como reguladores logísticos de las relaciones entre estado y sociedad. Se evalúa la importancia política de ambos argumentos. El artículo, siguiendo un enfoque de política pública comparada internacional, intenta enfocarse en la pertinencia política y académica de comparar tres paradigmas políticos y económicos desarrollados en diferentes contextos institucionales pero cuyo marco político puede ser representado como commensurable.
- **PALABRAS CLAVES:** Estado-Logístico; Modelo del Nuevo-Desarrollo; Estrategia Europa 2020; Neoliberalismo; Políticas Públicas Comparadas.
- **ABSTRACT:** Following an international comparative public policy approach, this paper compares the Brazilian logistic-state model and the

[£] Academic affiliation: Institute of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lisbon; Center for Administration and Public Policies. E-mail address: mjmfsp@gmail.com
Oikos Polis, Revista latinoamericana de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales, ISSN 2415-2250 (impresa)
ISSN 2521-960X (en línea), vol.4 n°2, 81-129, jul-dic 2019.
<https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3631672>

new-developmental model, introduced by Latin-American authors, with the European Union's Europe 2020 Strategy. The paper develops three main arguments: (i) that a relation of commensurability can be established between the Brazilian logistic state-model, its associated new-developmental model and the Europe 2020 Strategy, (ii) that the establishment of such a relation has to take into consideration the distinctions between Brazil and the European Union which represent distinct forms of political organization; and (iii) that the European Union's Europe 2020 Strategy represents the European Union and its member-states as logistic regulators concerning state-society relations. The policy significance of both arguments is evaluated. The paper, building from an international comparative public policy perspective, focus on the policy and academic relevance of comparing three policy paradigms developed in different institutional settings but whose policy framework can be represented as commensurable.

- **KEY WORDS:** Logistic-state-model; New-developmental model; Europe 2020 Strategy; Neoliberalism; Comparative Public Policy.
- Recepción: 29/05/2019 Aceptación: 10/10/2019

1. INTRODUCCIÓN

Building on an international comparative public policy conceptual model, the goal of this paper is to answer to the following research question: how can a relation of commensurability be established between the logistic-state model and the new-developmental model, developed by Brazilian authors (Cervo, 2003; Bresser-Pereira, 2006), and the Europe 2020 Strategy. The paper will develop three main arguments:

- (i) that a relation of commensurability can be established between the Brazilian logistic-state model, its associated new-developmental model, and the Europe 2020 Strategy;

- (ii) that the establishment of such a relation has to take into consideration the distinctions between Brazil and the European Union which represent distinct forms of political organization;
- (iii) that such relation of commensurability is visible in the way the Europe 2020 Strategy represents the European Union (EU) and its member-states as logistic regulators concerning state-society relations.

The objective of the paper is to discuss in what ways the EU can benefit from the study of how countries like Brazil have, in the recent past, addressed state-society relations by rethinking the neoliberal paradigm. In this context, a comparison will be established among Latin-American historically situated economic models whose goal was to prescribe public policy measures in the context of a developing Brazil, the Europe 2020 Strategy, and their underlying economic paradigms. A relation of commensurability is understood as a relation of accessibility, which means that “two theories are commensurable when they can be transformed into each other across appropriate conceptual dimensions” (Rossler, 2013, pp. 213-214). The paper recognizes that to establish a relation of commensurability between two distinct systems of political organization – a state and a hybrid intergovernmental organization – presents particular challenges. States like Brazil and the European Union (EU) are very different political, institutional, and legal constructions. In order for European regulations to become effective, they have to be transposed and implemented by each EU member-state (Börzel, 2003). This adds complexity to an already intricate political and juridical system (Börzel, 2003)

The paper concludes that as it has occurred with the adoption of the logistic-state model in Brazil, the Europe 2020 Strategy may also be understood as a response to “radical liberalism” (Cervo, 2003, paragraph 75).

Such a response, and again as it happened with the Brazilian historical experiment with the logistic-state model, targets the governance of state-society relations (David, 2018). The policy significance of the paper derives from its attempt to think about modes of governance that constitute alternative paths to “radical liberalism” (Cervo, 2003, paragraph 75), which is being contested worldwide (David, 2018). The paper assumes that the Brazilian logistic-state and new-developmental models and the Europe 2020 Strategy constitute alternative modes of governance to “radical liberalism” (Cervo, 2003, paragraph 75; Gill, 1998). To represent the European Union and its member-states as logistic regulators concerning state-society relations has benefits in terms of the construction of a more fair European Union in a context where the dissimilarities between core and peripheral EU member-states are profound and where radical liberal inspired austerity policies revealed to be controversial (Bouin, 2018). Adopting international comparative public policy as a conceptual model allows the paper to reason from its empirical reference points.

European studies literature has discussed the nature of the European Union political experiment as well as the fragilities of its economic integration model (see Bouin, 2018). However, there is a literature gap concerning the analysis of comparative public policy scenarios between the European Union and Latin-American countries. The European Union is understood as a role model in the field of regional economic integration, and comparative public policy is established predominantly among its member-states or between other European states and seldom with non-European countries (Olsen, 2002). Comparative politics is also employed to discuss the distinctions and similarities between the United States’ (US) federal model and the European Union as a political system (Hueglin & Fenna, 2015). Some studies extend the

analysis of federal experiments to other countries and compare them with the EU (Kopstein et al., 2014). However, in what public policy is concerned, there are not many studies focused on comparative public policy between the European Union and Latin-American countries. This paper tries to contribute to the development of those studies.

The paper will be comprised of four sections. The first section is constituted by the introduction. The second section is dedicated to methodological and theoretical questions. The section will discuss how comparative politics and international comparative public policy constitute viable conceptual frameworks to study the similarities between public policy regulatory models built in different regional contexts. The logistic-state model and the new-developmental model (Cervo, 2003; Bresser-Pereira, 2006) will be characterized in what concerns their origins, political and economic features, and regarding the motivations that led to the development of the models as regulatory approaches to state-society relations. The second section will also discuss the Europe 2020 Strategy. The European Union's road map in the area of competitiveness, growth, and employment will be addressed as embodying how European policy-makers understand economic and social regulation in the European space.

The third section will present the main findings of the paper and discuss their policy implications. The section will focus on the viability of establishing a relation of commensurability among the development of the logistic-state model as it was accomplished in Brazil and the Europe 2020 Strategy. The goal is to question if the Europe 2020 Strategy frames state-society regulation from a logistic agency perspective. Two assumptions are at the core of the third section. First, that both the Brazilian economy and the EU economy can be characterized through a core-periphery structural framework. Secondly,

that the logistic state-model, the new-developmental model, and the Europe 2020 Strategy can be interpreted as answers to “radical liberalism” and as being inspired by post-Keynesian perspectives (Cervo, 2003, paragraph 75; David, 2018).

The concluding section will assess the policy significance associated with the two arguments developed in the paper.

2. METHOD AND THEORY

2.1. Comparative politics and comparative public policy

The first chapter will start by questioning if comparative politics and international comparative public policy constitute possible conceptual frameworks to study the similarities between public policy regulatory models built in different regional contexts.

In the last decades, the disciplinary field of comparative politics has suffered fundamental transformations concerning its object of research, and investigation (Boix & Stokes, 2009, p. 544). The epistemological dimension of comparative politics’ evolution in recent years is particularly important since the research focus was (re)centered on “cross-national” comparisons between political systems and civic cultures of several states (Boix & Stokes, 2009, p. 544).

A particular research focus within comparative politics’ literature concerns the study of the mechanisms that lead to state formation, namely in what regards the “impact” of states or governmental-like structures on “economic growth” as well as on the “distributive and social consequences of the emergence of political authority” (Boix & Stokes, 2009, p. 545). Such an impact and consequences are particularly significant to understand the

relevance of comparing the development of the logistic-state paradigm as it was accomplished in Brazil and the Europe 2020 Strategy, which contains guidelines in the economic and social welfare areas. One of the main goals of comparative politics is to understand the variety of social, political and economic experiments constructed within political communities in order to enlighten if there are political, economic and social arrangements developed by political apparatus which “serve their people’s interests better than others,” namely by decreasing poverty and increasing social well-being (Orvis & Drogus, 2018, p. 3). By fulfilling such a goal, the discipline of comparative politics associates a theoretical dimension to a praxeological component focused on the assessment of the “existing possibilities as exemplified by the various forms of government in the states of the world” (Kopstein et al., 2014, p. 1).

There are two particular research areas that demonstrate the relevance of establishing a linkage among the scientific areas of comparative politics and international relations: the areas of comparative federalism and comparative public policy. Comparative federalism, as a sub-discipline, has emerged due to the “multifaceted” nature of federal experiments (Burgess, 2006, p. 1). The study of comparative federalism has gained increased relevance due to the “crisis of modern statehood” that highlights “the promise of federalism” for the constitution of political communities (Hueglin & Fenna, 2015, p. 2).

Comparative public policy studies have a pragmatic nature: their goal is to assist policy-makers in their effort to find public policy solutions by studying how other governments dealt with similar problems (Rose, 2005, p. 1). The goal is to comprehend “under what circumstances” and “to what extent” public policies or public regulatory models, proved to be efficient in

a particular country, may be successful in different geographical, cultural, political, and economic locations (Rose, 2005, p. 1).

Another element that endows international comparative public policy with increasing relevance is the fact that most public policy questions today are neither domestic nor external falling on what Rose designates as the category of “intermestic” which leads policy-makers to discuss policy solutions “by looking abroad” (Rose, 2005, p. 3). However, a comparative public policy exercise has to take into account the parallels and dissimilarities concerning the institutional environment within which policy-making is elaborated (Wilder, 2017). The risk derives from the need to circumvent the possibility of a misfit to impose a “fit” among empirical data and theoretical frameworks “designed with specific institutional configurations in mind” (Wilder, 2017, p. 1). Following Wilder, recent literature in comparative public policy has elaborated on new theoretical developments that enable “comparisons among and across dissimilar institutional settings” (Wilder, 2017, p. 1). By “looking beyond institutional settings, academics may compare policy discourses, policy paradigms, and political cultures among distinct geographical settings” (Wilder, 2017, p. 1). This paper is focused on the policy significance of comparing three policy paradigms developed in different institutional settings but whose policy framework can be represented as commensurable.

2.2. The “logistic-state” and the “new-developmental” models

Professor Amado Luiz Cervo, the main responsible for the introduction and development of the concept of the logistic-state model, in his article “Política Exterior e Relações Internacionais do Brasil” (2003) discusses what the author designates as the four main paradigms that have guided Brazil’s foreign policy. Those paradigms are: (i) the liberal-conservateur paradigm (19th century and

the First Republic), (ii) the paradigm of the developing state (1930-1989), (iii) the paradigm of the normal state (1990-2002), and (iv) the logistic-state paradigm (2003-2010). The author (2003, paragraph 7) defines a public policy paradigm as the representation of a nation constructed by a population and its leaders, the image that the political community adopts concerning the international system, and how the relationship between these two elements is established. A paradigm has a double performative role. It endows with meaning the cognitive behavior of the decision-maker and allows understanding the operational dimension of foreign and domestic public policy decision-making (Cervo, 2003).

Following Amado Cervo (2003), the logistic-state paradigm emerged due to problematics related to the implementation of neoliberal policies in Latin-American countries from the 1990s onwards (Cervo, 2003). Those problematics were discussed by several Latin-American critical thinkers organized in epistemic communities whose goal was to develop an alternative reading to the neoliberal interpretation of globalization (Cervo, 2003). Following Amado Cervo (2003), those experts did not sustain a return to the paradigm of the developing state but the implementation of the logistic-state paradigm.

As an ideology, the logistic-state paradigm comprises two fundamental elements: liberalism, as an external element, and concerning the internal realm, the element of development (Cervo, 2003). In Cervo's words (2003, paragraph 71), the logistic-state model "unites the classic doctrine of capitalism with Latin-American structuralism," locating the paradigm in the globalized "western order." To ensure such a location, the logistic-state model has to differentiate itself from the developing paradigm (Cervo, 2003). Such differentiation is insured by allocating to society, namely private investors and

entrepreneurs, economic responsibilities (Cervo, 2003). Regarding the normal state paradigm, there are also some significant distinctions since the logistic-state paradigm endows the state not only with the task of ensuring economic stability, but also the role of supporting civil and economic society in the “defense of their interests” (Cervo, 2003, paragraph 72). The argument is that social and economic interests should not be delivered only to market laws (Cervo, 2003) since a regulatory mechanism is necessary to correct the negative externalities that may be produced by those laws.

The goal of the logistic paradigm is to internalize, through a mimetic effect, the behavior of advanced societies considered as the blueprint of the paradigm (Cervo, 2003). Accordingly, Amado Cervo claims that the external logic of the logistic-state paradigm compels states to protect their national interests through the support of free-trade, the empowerment of foreign competitiveness, as well as, through consumer protection and welfare policies (Cervo, 2003). The goal is to liberate states from a condition of structural dependency to a condition of shared interdependency (Cervo, 2003). In order to achieve such a transformation, the logistic paradigm refuses what Amado Cervo (2003, paragraph 75) designates as “radical liberalism” promoting, instead, increased technological and financial autonomy, as well as the decrease of external vulnerability. Three objectives assume central importance: a competitive internal market, the availability of capital, and corporate foreign competitiveness (Cervo, 2003).

The “logistic” dimension of the paradigm is related to a renewed attitude of the state *vis-à-vis* society through which the state transfers to the private realm corporate responsibilities (Cervo, 2003). The performative role of the state is to give logistic support preferentially to private corporations – and only strategically to public enterprise – in order to empower the foreign

competitiveness of the national economy (Cervo, 2003). The importance of the economic dimension of state's performance is as significant as its social dimension since governments should preserve the welfare and social well-being of their populations, specifically in what regards wages, social income, and the availability of jobs (Cervo, 2003).

The logistic-state should be discussed as the product of a reflection about what degree of intervention states and entities with economic regulatory competences should pursue in what concerns economic activities (Machado, 2009). As Machado (2009, p. 20) claims, the question is what can be considered as the "right measure" regarding states' role in the economic realm within a liberal framework without reproducing the extremisms of complete economic de-regulation or state's economic control usually associated with the restrictions of private initiative. The model pursues three goals: to strengthen the state's apparatus by "transferring entrepreneurial responsibilities" to "society," to empower the state's agency in international relations and to guarantee a "balanced" foreign policy on behalf of national development (Machado, 2009, p. 20).

Historically, the logistic-state model was implemented in Brazil during the two Presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and also during the Presidencies of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (Machado, 2009, p. 20). In the context of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's Presidencies, when the logistic model started to be implemented, the goal was to consolidate the Brazilian democracy, achieve "fiscal responsibility," and stabilize the economy (Machado, 2009, p. 20). Cardoso's administration was, however, criticized for adopting an "acritical neoliberal attitude" (Machado, 2009, p. 8). During the Presidencies of Lula da Silva, such an attitude was tentatively corrected, which in association with a period of internal stability, led to a more mature and

“operational” execution of the logistic model (Machado, 2009, p. 20). The Lula Administration also tried to diminish “foreign financial and technological dependency” and, particularly, to develop social policies able to correct the massive “socio-economic” disparities existing among individuals and geographical regions in Brazil (Machado, 2009, p. 20). In accordance with statistics from the Brazilian Central Bank, between 2003 and 2009, the economical execution of the logistic-state model resulted in the growth of the gross domestic product (from 1.9% in 2003 to 5% in 2008), and in the significant decrease of the public debt as well as of the inflation rate (from 15% in 2003 to 5.8% in 2009) (Machado, 2009, p. 20).

The implementation of the logistic-state paradigm in Brasil was related to the (re)emergence in the 1990s of liberal beliefs concerning the state and its role in national economies (Sukiennik, 2008, paragraph 2). According to the “Washington consensus,” western economists established that the path to economic development required a diminished presence of the state in the economy, the privatization of public companies, and the liberalization of the internal market concerning foreign products (Sukiennik, 2008, paragraph 2). The consequences were contradictory: the economy became more stable than in the past, but the “low rates of economic growth and the increase of social inequalities demonstrated that the liberal state was not the more appropriate to replace the national-developing state model” (Sukiennik, 2008, paragraph 2). Consequently, from the 2000s onwards, international relations’ academics from the Brazilian University in association with Brazilian diplomatic personalities, namely Professor Amado Cervo, developed the model of the logistic-state (Sukiennik, 2008, paragraph 2). The goal was to overcome the frailties of the liberal model and the national-developing state model (Sukiennik, 2008). Academics tried to achieve a middle-term between both

models, by reducing state investment only to strategic realms in order to strengthen private initiative (Sukiennik, 2008). The need to strengthen private initiative and to (re)think the areas where the state should invest its public resources was discussed in a broader economic framework where globalization had already attained a level of full maturity (Bresser-Pereira, 2006).

What literature designates as the logistic-state model is associated with what Bresser-Pereira refers to as the new-developmental model (Bresser-Pereira, 2006; Sukiennik, 2008). Following the author (2006), the new-developmental model can be defined as a belief system that has, in its core, the need to achieve an internal consensus about a national development strategy. Such a development strategy should focus on the following priorities (Bresser-Pereira, 2006):

- (i) to strengthen fiscal policies;
- (ii) to empower the competitiveness of private companies;
- (iii) the control of interest rates;
- (iv) to decrease public debt;
- (v) to ensure a fair distribution of national income.

In what concerns the Brazilian economy, Bresser-Pereira (2006, p. 13) argues that questions concerning national distributive justice are fundamental since development in Brasil is stalled not only by the lack of a sense of “nation,” but also by “the concentration of rent, that besides being unfair” creates the perfect conditions for the emergence of “all sorts of populism.” Also, a “national strategy of development” demands a robust governmental apparatus able to build an economic policy based on the decrease of public spending, the increase of strategic public investment, the articulation between more qualified human capital and stronger technological progress, the growth

of economic and social cohesion, and the empowerment of domestic social capital and civil society (Bresser-Pereira, 2006, p. 14). The democratization of the governmental apparatus and the construction of a stronger sense of collective identity should be associated with a “macro-economic policy” able to ensure the “state’s financial health” translated in the significant decrease of both private and public debt levels (Bresser-Pereira, 2006, p.14).

Bresser-Pereira argues (2006, p. 14) that the implementation of a new-developmental model, that following Sukiennik (2008, p. 2) “economically complements” the logistic-state model, highlights the performative power of institutions and public policies since the latter should be designed following context-specific perspectives. Following the author, a “national development strategy” will be empowered and meaningful when public institutions and public policies are enduring and capable of giving an “answer to social needs” (Bresser-Pereira, 2006, p. 14).

The model advocated by Bresser-Pereira (2006, p. 17) opposes the neoliberal ideology, which argues that a solid governmental apparatus is the antithesis of a competitive market. In the words of Bresser-Pereira (2006, p. 17), the neoliberal “conventional orthodoxy” supports the “ideology of the minimum State, the Police State, that is only concerned with domestic and foreign security, leaving economic coordination, public investments, health care, and public education services in the hands of the market.” The new-developmental model rejects commercial protectionist policies and upholds the belief that governments should pursue a strategic industrial policy only supporting companies that have economic conditions to become internationally competitive (Bresser-Pereira, 2006, p. 18). The author (2006, p. 18) highlights that the neoliberal “conventional orthodoxy” is “pessimistic” concerning the state’s ability to correct the negative externalities of the market

and to put in place a stronger market associated with effective mechanisms regarding income distribution. The new-developmental model refuses such a pessimistic perspective and considers that a strong market has to be associated with a strong government, stable and democratic institutions, and efficient public policies in the realms of distributive justice and income distribution (Bresser-Pereira, 2006, p. 14). Following Sukiennik (2008, paragraph 4), the goal is to establish an articulation between the “positive aspects” of liberalism and Keynesianism.

As previously mentioned, the logistic model was executed in Brazil throughout the two Presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and also during the Presidencies of Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (Machado, 2009, p. 20). The execution of the model empowered Brazil’s international economic relations and sponsored the growth of external investments financed by the National Bank of Economic and Social Development (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social/BNDES) (Bugiato and Berringer, 2012, p. 28). In fact, in 2006, for the first time in Brazilian history, the bulk of Brazilian foreign direct investments was higher in comparison with the numbers regarding foreign investment in the country (Bugiato & Berringer, 2012, p. 30).

The success of the logistic state model raised a debate concerning its features as an economic and political paradigm (Bugiato & Berringer, 2012). In economic terms, some literature considers that the implementation of the logistic-state model allowed the emergence of a positive articulation between governmental foreign and economic policies (Valdez, 2011; Bugiato & Berringer 2012, 34). Such articulation brought economic stability and engaged the state in what Valdez (2002, p. 70) designates as a “neo-developmental” project (see also Bugiato & Berringer, 2012, p. 35).

The implementation of the logistic-state paradigm at the level of Brazil's economic policies may be regarded as a strategy whose core purpose was to engage the state into a neo-developmental project based on "social inclusion," "economic stability" and the construction of a vigorous internal market (Valdez, 2002, p. 70). Bugiato and Berringer (2012, p. 35) do not consider that the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula da Silva have constituted a new "type of state." However, they admit that the economic development which occurred from 2000s onwards allowed for a reconfiguration of the Brazilian social tissue resulting in the empowerment of the "big bourgeois" social class, but also in the strengthening of lower classes due to the increase of social policies, the diminution of unemployment rates and the rise of the minimum wage (Bugiato & Berringer, 2012, p. 41).

2.3. The Europe 2020 Strategy: enhancing competitiveness through a logistic frame of governance

The Europe 2020 Strategy is defined as the European Union's action plan for increasing growth, social welfare, and competitiveness in the European economic space (EC, 2010). Some of its most significant priorities concern employment as well as poverty and social exclusion policies. The Strategy, elaborated by the European Commission, highlights the need to ensure "smart sustainable and inclusive growth as a way to overcome the structural weakness in Europe's economy, improve its competitiveness and productivity and underpin a sustainable social market economy" (EU, 2019, paragraph 1). The "structural weakness in Europe's economy" is related to the social and economic inequalities among EU member-states (EU, 2019, paragraph 1; Table 1).

Table 1: Economic Disparities Among EU Countries

Member-States	Gross Domestic Product / 2018 (current prices; US billions \$)	Member-States	Gross Domestic Product per capita 2019 Estimates/purchasing power parity (current US \$)	Member-States	Unemployment Rate (2018)
Germany	4.029.140	Luxembourg	112.622.854	Greece	20.2%
United Kingdom	2.808.899	Netherlands	59.105.145	Spain	15.2%
France	2.794.696	Germany	54.983.520	Italy	10.9%
Italy	2.086.911	Austria	54.083.767	France	9.2%
Spain	1.437.047	Denmark	53.563.810	Croatia	9.2%
Croatia	59.971	Latvia	31.215.347	The Netherlands	3.9%
Lithuania	52.468	Greece	30.522.243	Poland	3.7%
Latvia	34.286	Croatia	27.664.180	Hungary	3.6%
Estonia	29.527	Romania	27.653.322	Germany	3.4%
Cyprus	23.963	Bulgaria	24.576.502	Czech Republic	2.4%

Source: International Monetary Fund; World Economic Outlook Database, 2018.Statista. The Statistics Portal. Unemployment rate in member-states of the European Union in June 2018.

The targets comprised in the Strategy are the following: (i) employment, (ii) research and development, (iii) climate change and energy, (iv) education, and (v) poverty and social exclusion (EU, 2019, paragraph 2). For each target, the EU established general parameters to be attained by states until 2020 (EU, 2019, paragraph 3). We should look at each target as interdependent and following a logic of strict articulation (EU, 2019, paragraph 4).

The attainment of those general parameters by member-states involves horizontal policy transfer mechanisms associated with a multi-level

governance process (EU, 2019). It involves horizontal policy transfer mechanisms since the targets established at the EU level are “translated into national targets,” and it is the responsibility of the member-states to assess their evolution regarding each parameter (EU, 2019, paragraph 3). Horizontal policy transfer embodies a multi-governance process as the targets established by the Strategy are attained “through a mix of national and EU action” (EU, 2019, paragraph 3). The multi-level governance component of the Strategy is fundamental since the targets included in the Europe 2020 Strategy work as a “reference framework” empowering activities at European, national and regional levels (EU, 2019, paragraph 3). European institutions and member-states collaborate to appraise how each country is meeting the aforementioned general parameters (EU, 2019, paragraph 5). Such a process of peer-review, monitorization, and assessment is non-coercive since we are dealing with policy areas where Europeanization happens through horizontal policy transfer (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002).

In addition to processual questions involving multi-level governance processes, it is central to address what are the economic objectives that the European Union wants to achieve with the Strategy (EU, 2019). In the “Council Recommendation (EU) 2015/1184 of 14 July 2015 on broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the European Union,” a legal act which is included in Europe 2020 Strategy, it can be read that the recent financial crisis highlighted the existence of structural fragilities in the European and member-states economies that should be corrected through the following measures: (i) decrease of public debt levels, (ii) fiscal sustainability and responsibility, (iii) inclusive growth, sustainable growth and job creation, (iv) public policies aimed at fostering

investment, and (iv) structural reforms (Council of the European Union, 2015a).

Another priority underpinned by the 2015 “Council Recommendations” concerns the social dimension of the Strategy. The document is very explicit in its purpose to “address the social impact of the crisis” through the institutionalization of a “cohesive society” in which individuals are “empowered to anticipate and manage change and can actively participate in society and the economy” (Council of the European Union, 2015a, paragraph 4). The “Council Recommendations” are adamant in stressing the need to ensure the efficiency of labour markets, namely in what concerns the reducing of obstacles to “labour market participation,” as well in what regards the need to guarantee that the “benefits of economic growth reach all citizens and all regions” (Council of the European Union, 2015a, paragraph 4). The guidelines established by the “Council Recommendations” are achieved through a multi-level governance apparatus involving the member-states, European institutions, regional and local authorities, national parliaments, and civil society representatives (Council of the European Union, 2015a, paragraph 5-6). Such a multi-level governance apparatus is intended to mirror the economic and social specificities characteristic of each member-state (Council of the European Union, 2015a, paragraph 7).

The guidelines comprised in the “Council Recommendations” in the area of sustainable growth and employment should be interpreted in association with the “Council Decision (EU) 2015/1848 of 5 October 2015 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States for 2015.” The document states the EU’s perspective regarding the modernization of welfare systems (Council of the European Union, 2015). It declares that social protection should comprise all demographic sectors of a society to ensure

protection from childhood to old age (Council of the European Union, 2015b, Guideline 8) The document establishes an articulation between welfare systems, social inclusion, inequality and active participation in the labor market (Council of the European Union, 2015b, Guideline 8). A 2019 study, whose goal was to assess the EU members-states' progress regarding the priorities established by the Europe 2020 Strategy (Fedajev et al. 2020), concluded that such progress was very disparate and unequal among member-states. States like Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Finland and France recorded the best performance results, while countries Lithuania, Slovenia, Croatia, and the Czech Republic also attained significant results (Fedajev et al. 2020). However, Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, and the Netherlands recorded weak performances (Fedajev et al. 2020).

3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

3.1. The Logistic-State and New-Developmental Models, the Europe 2020 Strategy and Latin-American structuralism

The third section will present the main findings of the paper and discuss their policy implications. The section will focus on the viability of comparing the conceptual framework of the logistic-state and new-developmental models (Cervo, 2003; Bresser-Pereira, 2006) and the Europe 2020 Strategy. The section will also question if the Europe 2020 Strategy frames state-society regulation from a logistic agency perspective.

The logistic-state model and the Europe 2020 Strategy are, in Amado Cervo's definition, public policy paradigms since both regulatory models identify long-term interests for particular political communities articulated into a "cosmivision that merges information about the domestic and

international realms in order to develop a “strategic calculus” (Cervo, 2003, paragraph 7). As Cervo argues, a public policy paradigm has a dual function, for it allows one to comprehend the cognitive behavior of the decision-maker and to appreciate the operational dimension of public policy decision-making (Cervo, 2003). It should be highlighted that the historical development of the logistic-state model (2003-2010) in Brazil was followed by the decision to implement, the EU level, the Europe 2020 Strategy. Also, both the logistic-state model and the Europe 2020 Strategy were implemented, in their respective geographical contexts, in chronological periods where economic dependency was recognized as a restrictive factor of national development (Cervo, 2003; Costa, 2018). The emergence, in early 2010, of the European sovereign debt crisis, coincided with the decision to launch the Europe 2020 Strategy (Ferreira & Fonseca, 2015). When presenting the Europe 2020 Strategy, then European Commission President Durão Barroso (2010, paragraph 4) argued, “The crisis is a wake-up call, the moment where we recognize that ‘business as usual’ would consign us to a gradual decline, to the second rank of the new global order.”

In Brazil, the logistic state-model was implemented after the adoption of the normal state paradigm (Cervo, 2003). The normal state paradigm advocated the embracing of neoliberal policies as a way to surpass the economic crisis that afflicted Latin-American economies since the 1970s (Machado, 2009, p. 36). The TINA (“There is no Alternative”) argument to neoliberal policies, materialized in the Washington consensus and espoused by both Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, led to the adoption in several countries of de-regulation and liberalization measures fully congruent with market neoliberalism (Sparke, 2013). Neoliberal policies included the liberalization of trade, investment, and capital associated with the privatization

of “state companies” and the protection of property rights (Machado, 2009, p. 36). The logic behind the normal state paradigm was that neoliberalism would bring interdependence among states, and the internationalization of the internal market would lead to economic development (Machado, 2009, p. 53). However, the adoption of the normal state paradigm signified a necessary subjugation to the main powers of the global economy (Machado, 2009, p. 54). It should also be noted that foreign capital dependency associated with the privatization of national assets increased the vulnerability and dependency of Latin-American economies (Machado, 2009, p. 55).

In what concerns the European Union, the Europe 2020 Strategy was conditioned by the 2007/2008 sub-prime crisis and by the consequent EU member-states’ sovereign debt crisis that forced the intervention of European Union’s institutions and the World Monetary Fund in countries like Greece and Portugal (Fonseca & Ferreira, 2015). In the period that followed the sovereign debt crisis and due to the need to reshape the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy were overshadowed by the adoption of what Gill (1998, p. 5) designates as “disciplinary neoliberalism” policies and discourses. The concept of “disciplinary neoliberalism” can be defined as a discourse centered on the “security of property rights and investor freedoms, and market discipline on the state and labor, to secure ‘credibility’ in the eyes of private investors” (Gill, 1998, p. 5). European governments were compelled to be “more responsive to the discipline of market forces” and less “responsive to popular democratic forces” (Gill, 1998, p. 5). The “commodity logic of capital” became a predominant force (Gill, 1998, p. 5). Austerity policies adopted in member-states, which were the object of bailout programs, transformed an economic and financial crisis into a social and political crisis (Lapavitsas et al., 2012).

Based on a neoliberal logic, austerity policies forced states, subjected to bailout programs, to significantly decrease their public spending and to ensure the flexibilization of labor market rules (Caldas, 2012). The EU became a copiously neoliberal agent whose principal goal was to promote private investment and the fostering of free enterprise (David, 2018). As a result, the traditional democratic relationship between voters and their elected representatives was shattered, which led to the erosion of classic liberal electoral and non-electoral vertical accountability procedures (David, 2018). Civil society strongly reacted against continuous political and economic attacks to the social contract model, which has always constituted the core of European liberal democracies (David, 2018).

The debate on the efficiency of austerity measures included the discussion about the structuralist concept of center-periphery to highlight the existence of peripheral European countries, which, after the crisis of 2007/2008, could not cope with its consequences plunging into a sovereign debt crisis (Lapavistas et al., 2012). Despite having tried to “disguise” their public debt problems, peripheral countries became exposed due to the fragility of their economies (Lapavistas et al., 2012). Core European member-states imposed “fiscal stringency” on these countries with unpredictable consequences (Lapavistas et al., 2012). EMU rules worsened the social and economic conditions of peripheral countries since they were designed to protect the “interests of financial capital,” which aggravated the “position of labor compared to capital” (Lapavistas et al., 2012). The capital-state relations were overprotected, but state-society relations were forgotten (Lapavistas et al., 2012).

In this context, the relations between Germany and the Eurozone peripheral countries assumed increased relevance (Lapavistas et al., 2012, 4).

In the words of Lapavitsas et al., the result of the eurozone policies was a “structural current account surplus for Germany, mirrored by current account deficits for peripheral countries” (Lapavitsas et al., 2012, p. 4). A core-periphery analysis has led to the conclusion that the efficient association of countries with disparate development levels into the eurozone cannot be accomplished through the coercion of the most fragile member-states to behave following the German example and accordingly to the idea of an Optimum Currency Area (Celi & Ginzburg, 2018, p. 17). Once more, what is in question is how to shape state-society relations, namely in peripheral countries where wages are lower and social welfare is more fragile (Lapavitsas et al., 2012). The distributional dimension of economic policies assumes, in this context, central importance (Lapavitsas et al., 2012). It has to be taken into consideration that, in addition to the existence of a center-periphery distinction among EU countries, there also discrepancies regarding types of welfare states in Europe (Learneurope, 2019). We can establish a distinction between six types of welfare states within the wider European Economic Area, namely: (i) the social-democratic/Nordic model (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland); (ii) the conservative/corporatist model (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal); (iii) the Anglo-Saxon/liberal model (United Kingdom and Ireland); (iv) the model of the former Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); (v) the model of post-communist Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and, finally, (vi) welfare states model an a development process (Romania) (Learneurope, 2019).

Following Armando Di Filippo (2009, p. 175), within economic institutionalist literature, the Latin-American structuralist theory has

developed a very particular approach to economic theory, which includes a new perspective to the concept of economic value. Economic structuralist theory designed a “systemic, multidimensional and dynamic approach” that was applied to the study and discussion of how to improve the “social distribution of labor productivity generated in the central economies and the effects of these on the societies of the periphery” (Di Filippo, 2009, p. 175). One of the central components of the Latin-American structuralist economic theory concerns its perspective about the performative role of the market (Di Filippo, 2009, p. 175). The market is not understood as a “self-regulating system that returns to stable equilibrium positions,” but as a “quantitative expression of the national or international power status of contracting parties” (Di Filippo, 2009, p. 175). According to Di Filippo (2009, p. 176), through its study of the articulation between the market and the development of price systems, Latin-American structuralist economic literature introduced an element often neglected in economic theory: human societies and their “multidimensional” and “historical dynamics.” Such introduction is particularly visible in the theoretical perspective on prices and the market adopted by Latin-American structuralists who argue that the “existence” of a market mirrors the “power positions of social actors in relation to the different spheres of each society” (Di Filippo 2009, p. 177).

As a result of such perspective on the markets, Latin-American structuralists give a considerable relevance to the distributional dimension of national and international political economy (Di Filippo, 2009, p. 181). The importance of questions related to social and economic distribution is that they enhance how, in neoliberal economies, the growth of distributional surplus may occur without consequences in terms of “social output” (Di Filippo, 2009, p. 177). As Di Filippo claims, “[w]hen markets are allowed to

follow their own dynamic, the result, in both the center and the periphery, is an intensification of structural heterogeneity (...) and income concentration” (Di Filippo, 2009, p. 188). The governmental apparatus is regarded, by the Latin-American structuralist economic literature, as the source of institutional roles and as a strategic player in neoliberal economies since it can alter the “original distribution of income” through the “redistributive effects” associated with fiscal policy as well as with the delivery of “public goods”, namely justice, education, and health (Di Filippo, 2009, p. 181).

The role of the governmental apparatus is vital since the global financial crisis may be explained by the structural features of the neoliberal economy, which allowed an over-relaxation of regulatory rules and institutions that should have controlled the workings of “global capitalism” (Di Filippo, 2009, p. 194). In this context, the result was that transnational companies felt empowered to maximize their profits (Di Filippo, 2009, p. 194). The relaxation of regulatory rules is one of the reasons that explain the late 2008 financial crisis (Di Filippo, 2009, p. 194) that led to the European sovereign debt crisis. When markets are not regulated, there is a growth of “structural heterogeneity” as well as “income concentration” in **both** periphery countries and countries located at the center of the world economy (Di Filippo, 2009, p. 181). Consequently, both periphery and center countries have to create regulatory mechanisms to control negative market externalities (Di Filippo, 2009, p. 181).

In the European Union, negative market externalities are managed through a series of instruments, namely the Europe 2020 Strategy or new regulatory policies (opposed to old regulatory policies or market-making policies) established through positive integration mechanisms (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002). New regulatory policies intend to limit negative externalities

that result from the free functioning of market economies in domains like the environment, consumer protection, work safety and, some areas of social policy (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002). In the EU context, positive integration aimed at implementing public policy regulatory models that may control the “negative externalities of market activities” coexists with old regulatory policies, also designated as market-making policies or negative integration policies (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2012).

3.2. The logistic-state model, the new-developmental model, and the Europe 2020 Strategy: a question of commensurability?

In this context, in what terms is it possible to consider that a relation of commensurability can be established between the logistic-state model, the new-developmental model, and the Europe 2020 Strategy? To argue that a principle of commensurability can be established between the logistic-state model, the new-developmental model, and the Europe 2020 Strategy means that they share the same conceptual framework and that they employ overlapping languages that allow for a relation to be established (Pearce, 1987; Griffin, 1997). Following Griffin (1997, p. 59), the question of commensurability mirrors the likeness and “mutual” reducibility of “standing concerns that make up our orientation towards the distinct values and commitments that impinge upon us in different sorts or situations.” The analysis of commensurability relations between policy paradigms demonstrates that the complex concepts of commensurability and incommensurability have “application to specific historically determined choices or options, or to sets of them” (Griffin, 1997, p. 59). The use of overlapping languages as a necessary condition for the study of commensurability derives from the importance of “intertheory translation,”

which Pearce (1987, p. 6) considers as a fundamental instrument of the “process of rational theory comparison.”

Two distinct elements establish a principle of commensurability between the two models and the European strategy aforementioned: structural and policy elements. Structural and policy elements establish a conceptual framework that permits to compare the logistic-state and the new-developmental models and the Europe 2020 Strategy.

Structural elements are related to two core assumptions, namely the fact that both the Brazilian economy and the EU economy can be characterized by a core-periphery structural framework (see Becker & Egler, 1992; Costa, 2018). Structural elements are also related to a second assumption: that the logistic-state model, the new-developmental model, and the Europe 2020 Strategy can be interpreted as answers to a common concern: “radical liberalism” (Cervo, 2003, paragraph 75; Gill, 1998).

Core-periphery structural dynamics, although distinct, are visible in Brazil and the European Union. As Becker and Egler (1992, p. 10) state, Latin American countries constitute the “oldest periphery of the world-economy.” Latin-America economic history is deeply related with the development of what Becker and Egler (1992, p. 11) designate as a “certain kind of capitalism” whereby the development, in countries like Brazil, of a “national mercantile economy” was not associated with the growth of productive forces (Becker & Egler, 1992, p. 11). Those forces arose latter articulated with industrialization dynamics (Becker & Egler, 1992, p. 11). Consequently, Latin-America countries become dependent on exportations, and when states like Brazil arrived at the world market, the latter was already controlled by large corporations (Becker & Egler, 1992, p. 11). In the case of Brazil, the late arrival

to the world market initiated and perpetuated the “center-periphery structure” that is at the roots of Brazilian underdevelopment (Becker & Egler, 1992, p. 10). The causes that explain Brazilian enduring development problems are very complex (Amman & Azzoni, 2018). Questions like the technological heterogeneity and hybridity of Brazilian economic sectors are fundamental to understand the evolution of Brazil’s economic history (Amann & Azzoni, 2018).

In what concerns the European Union, it should be noted that within discussions regarding European core-periphery structural dynamics, technological asymmetry, export dependency, and industrialization problems are recurrent issues (Duarte & Pascariu, 2017, p. xxv). The European sovereign-debt crisis exposed the “north-south productivity divide” (Duarte & Pascariu, 2017, p. xxv). The crisis demonstrated that a group of southern countries, namely Portugal and Greece, had serious macroeconomic problems (Duarte & Pascariu, 2017). Like southern countries, eastern European countries also experienced difficulties concerning the goal of real economic convergence (Duarte & Pascariu, 2017). The core-periphery structural divide in the European Union affects the European economy, the well-being of its citizens as well as the development of a European political awareness (Duarte & Pascariu, 2017). As Duarte and Pascariu (2017) argue, the question that needs to be addressed is whether the development of the internal market will inevitably lead to the reproduction of a core-periphery divide or if it may promote European convergence. The effects of peripherality, demonstrated by the existence of significant disparities among EU member-states concerning the Gross Domestic Product, the Gross Domestic Product per capita, and the unemployment rate seem to confirm the first hypothesis (IMF, 2018; Statista, 2018; Table 1). However, as it happens in Brazil, European

core-periphery dynamics are very complex and mean much more than the simple periphery subjugation to the core (Duarte & Pascariu, 2017, p. 195).

In this context, can the logistic and new-developmental models and the Europe 2020 strategy be understood as answers to “radical liberalism” (Cervo, 2003, paragraph 75)?

The logistic-state paradigm arose from the disappointment concerning the application of neoliberal policies in Latin-American countries from the 1990s onwards (Cervo, 2003). The logistic-state model established an articulation between Latin-American structuralism and neoliberalism (Cervo, 2003). However, it is represented as a western paradigm (Cervo, 2003). Latin-American structuralism is present in the claim that social and economic interests should not be ruled only through market laws and that regulatory policies are required to redress the negative consequences produced by free-market laws (Cervo, 2003). Therefore, the logistic paradigm refuses what Amado Cervo (2003, paragraph 75) designates as “radical liberalism.” The location of the model as a western paradigm results from the belief that the objective of the logistic paradigm is to adopt, through an effect of isomorphism, the economic and social models of developed countries (Cervo, 2003).

The new-developmental model developed by Bresser-Pereira (2006, p. 17) also clashes with the neoliberal argument that a sturdy governmental apparatus is the opposite of a solid free-market. The author (2006, p. 17) claims that a robust regulatory state apparatus may be a condition for a “strong market.” The new-developmental model is not, consequently, congruent with the belief that liberal societies should be governed by weak governmental regulatory structures (Bresser-Pereira 2006, p. 14). Those market-oriented

governmental regulatory structures should be strong enough to promote income distribution and income growth through the strengthening of the free market, but also to guarantee market correction whenever negative market externalities may ensue (Bresser-Pereira, 2006).

The Europe 2020 Strategy can also be considered as a tentative answer to “radical liberalism” (Cervo, 2003, paragraph 75) insofar as it proposes policies predominantly designed to empower the Union and its member-states to act in the presence of distortions caused by the workings of the internal market. In the “Council Recommendations (EU) 2015/1184 of 14 July 2015 on broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the European Union,” it is written that the social effects of the financial crisis should be approached in order to construct a more solid society in which individuals are capable of forestalling social and economic transformation, and can dynamically participate in society and the economy (Council of the European Union 2015a).

The “Council Recommendations” also stress the need to foster an “efficient low carbon economy,” as well as “green” jobs and technologies (Council of the European Union 2015a, Guideline 3). The “environmental” and “social” impacts of European legislation are considered as a priority (Council of the European Union 2015a, Guideline 3). The document also argues that the articulation between “growth-friendly” fiscal policies and the “Stability and Growth Pact” should assist in the correction of “market inefficiencies” (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 4). The “Council Recommendations” also warn states against the “distributional effects” of tax policies, namely in what concerns “aggressive tax planning” (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 4).

It is noteworthy that the “Council Recommendations” frequently employ the expression “structural reforms” as a path to enhance the growth and competitiveness of the European economy (Council of the European Union, 2015a, paragraph 3). Those structural reforms should be implemented through a coordinated approach between the European Union and its member states (Council of the European Union, 2015a, paragraph 5). Such an appeal to the development of structural reforms, which became a priority after the sovereign debt crisis, demonstrates that the Europe 2020 Strategy embodies the perspective that liberal societies can be governed by governmental regulatory structures, at EU and national levels, able to implement “ambitious” structural policy transformations (Council of the European Union 2015a, Guideline 2).

3.3. The EU and its member-states as logistic state-society regulators?

As previously mentioned, structural and policy elements establish a conceptual framework that permits to compare the logistic-state and the new-developmental models and the Europe 2020 Strategy. Policy elements are related to the analysis of how the Europe 2020 Strategy frames state-society regulation from a logistic agency perspective.

In order to assess if the Europe 2020 Strategy frames state-society regulation from a logistic agency perspective, it is necessary to define what exactly is a logistic regulator perspective. The previous analysis of the logistic-state and new- developmental models demonstrates that a logistic regulator perspective may be characterized by the following core seven features: (i) the articulation between liberalism and development, (ii) the empowerment of corporate foreign competitiveness, (iii) the strengthening of welfare and employment policies, (iv) the transference to the private realm of corporate

responsibilities, (v) the allocation of logistic support preferentially to private enterprises, (vi) the introduction of regulatory mechanisms to correct market's negative externalities and, (vii) sound public financial policies and a fair distribution of income (Cervo, 2003; Bresser-Pereira, 2006).

A way to evaluate if the Europe 2020 Strategy frames state-society regulation from a logistic agency perspective is to appraise if the models and the European Strategy discussed in this paper employ overlapping languages (Table 2). An analysis of textual passages taken from the “Council Recommendations (EU) 2015/1184 of 14 July 2015 on broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the European Union” and from the “Council Decision (EU) 2015/1848 of 5 October 2015 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States for 2015” shows that the main features of the models abovementioned find a textual correspondence with the previously referred “Council Recommendations” (2015a) and “Council Decision” (2015b). Such textual correspondence demonstrates the existence of overlapping languages employed to describe the logistic-state and new-developmental models and the provisions established in the core legal documents implementing the Europe 2020 Strategy.

An analysis of the “Council Recommendations (EU) 2015/1184 on broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the European Union” and the “Council Decision (EU) 2015/1848 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States for 2015” shows that the EU assumes a logistic role predominantly concerning the allocation of logistic support preferentially to private enterprises. Regarding state transference to the private realm of corporate responsibilities, it needs to be taken into consideration the importance of the European Commission's Communication on “A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social

Responsibility” (Feature iv), where the Commission states that “enterprises can significantly contribute to the European Union’s treaty objectives of sustainable development and a highly competitive social market economy” (EC, 2011). The document (EC, 2011, p. 3) defines corporate social responsibilities (CSR) as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis.” The Commission’s Communication establishes a bridge between its strategic approach to CSR and the Europe 2020 Strategy since CSR is considered as supporting the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy for “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth,” namely regarding the attainment of employment targets (EC, 2011, p. 1).

In this perspective, the European Union reserves for itself a role which, in line with the already described logistic paradigm, can be considered as a logistic performative role that partially results from the demands inherent to the European Economic and Monetary Union. In the “Council Recommendations” (Council of the European Union, 2015a, paragraph 5) it is written that,

“The Europe 2020 strategy should be underpinned by an integrated set of European and national policies, which Member-States and the Union should implement in order to achieve the positive spillover effects of coordinated structural reforms, an appropriate overall economic policy mix and a more consistent contribution from European policies to the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy, and in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union.”

The logistic performative role can also be identified in the responsibilities that the European institutions allocate to themselves and member-states’ governments in the field of (i) investment promotion, (ii)

structural reforms, (iii) job creation, (iv) sustainable growth, (v) the sustainability of public finances, and (v) employment policies (Council of the European Union, 2015a).

In what concerns the promotion of investment (Feature v), it should be highlighted the importance of the European funds, namely the European Fund for Strategic Investment as well as other structural funds which the European Union manages through a “result-oriented-approach” associated with the increased employment of pioneering “financial instruments” (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 1). Among those financial instruments, it must be emphasized the creation by the European Union of a “European Investment Advisory Hub” supervised by the European Investment Bank as well as of a “pipeline of projects” (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 1). The overall objective is to “improve the investment environment” by guaranteeing “financial stability” and “regulatory predicability,” considered as fundamental elements to maintain the EU “attractive” for private investment and, in particular, for foreign investment (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 1). Following the logistic paradigm, the “Council Recommendations” stress that “[c]lose cooperation with all relevant stakeholders is key, in order to ensure a smooth carrying out of operations, adequate risk-taking and maximum added value” (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 1).

In the domain of structural reforms (Features ii and iii), the logistic role is mainly attributed to member-states (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 2). Such a performative role is especially important concerning the labor market, social welfare and pensions systems, competitiveness, economic and social cohesion, and sustainable public finances (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 2). The main goals concern the correction of

detrimental macroeconomic disparities and the increase of social and economic cohesion among member-states (Council of the European Union, 2015a). States should promote “competition-enhancing reforms,” specifically in the field of the “non-tradable sector,” as well as an improved performance of the labor market and the construction of a more favorable “business environment” (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 2). The document also exhorts states to create partnerships between the public sector and private institutions in the field of the digital economy (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 2).

Concerning the arena of sustainable growth and employment, the European Union acknowledges that in order to ensure increased competitiveness and a better “business environment” capable of attracting investment, the EU needs to complete and to strengthen the internal market (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 2). However, the “Council Recommendations” advert that a “strengthened regulatory and supervisory provisions, and consumer protection rules in the area of financial markets and financial institutions, should be fully implemented” (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 3 / Feature vi).

The EU also established as a priority the constitution of an “affordable, secure and sustainable” energy market (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 3). In this context, the EU recognizes the need to give special consideration to the sector of energy, transportation, and infrastructures (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 3). The “Council Recommendations” argues that,

“Union legislation should focus on those issues that are best dealt with at European level, and should be designed taking into account their

economic, environmental and social impact. Creating a level playing field across borders with greater regulatory predictability and in full compliance with competition rules will further attract investment”. (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 3)

A more stable investment environment is regarded as having beneficial effects within European borders as well as concerning European external relations (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 3). The “Council Decision (EU) 2015/1848 of 5 October 2015 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States for 2015” establishes that a logistic role should be shared among the European Union and the member-states with the goal of achieving high employment rates, an adjustable workforce and social progress (Council of the European Union, 2015b, paragraph 1).

Finally, in the domain of public finances and its sustainability (Feature vii), the “Council Recommendations” establish an articulation between sustainable public finances, employment and, investment growth (Council of the European Union, 2015a). Once more, the logistic role is allocated particularly to member-states since the control of debt rates and deficit levels are predominantly a national responsibility although executed under the rules of the European Stability and Growth Pact (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 3). Member-states decide on their fiscal policies and have to balance “expenditure reforms” with the “modernization of the revenue system” preserving, through such balance, effective resource distribution, employment, growth, and social equity (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 3). The “distributional effects” of taxation reforms, and due to social cohesion and equity concerns, are considered as particularly important (Council of the European Union, 2015a, Guideline 3). However, in the field of the sustainability of public finances as well as in the area of

sustainable growth and employment, the European Union has a vital logistic role due to the importance of the European Semester (Council of the European Union, 2015b). The European Semester articulates different instruments in the domain of policy coordination, fiscal policies as well as in the complex arena of macroeconomic policies and structural reforms (Council of the European Union, 2015b, paragraph 4). The goal inherent to the creation of the European semester was to implement what the “Council Decision” defines as an “overarching framework for integrated multilateral surveillance of economic, budgetary, employment and social policies” (Council of the European Union, 2015b, paragraph 4). In the particular arena of employment policies, education, public administration reform, and social inclusion, the European Union provides resources through the European Social Fund while, simultaneously, recommending to member-states the need to establish a balance between labour flexibility and labour security (“flexicurity principles”) (Council of the European Union, 2015b, Guideline 7). Instruments like the European Social Fund demonstrate the importance that the articulation between liberalism and development assumes in the European context (Feature i).

Table 2: Textual Correspondence Exercise

Logistic State Model /New Developmental Model	EU 2020 Strategy
The articulation between liberalism and development	“Creating a level playing field across borders with greater regulatory predictability and in full compliance with competition rules will further attract investment. A better and more predictable business environment is particularly important in network industries characterized by long investment horizons and large-scale initial investments.” (Council of the European Union 2015b Guideline 3)
Introduction of a regulatory mechanism	“Shifts towards more growth-friendly taxes, while ensuring compliance with the Stability and Growth

<p>to correct the market's negative externalities</p>	<p>Pact, can help correct market inefficiencies and lay foundations for sustained growth and job creation. At the same time, it is important to consider the distributional effects in any change in taxation.” (Council of the European Union 2015a, Guideline 4)</p>
<p>Empowerment of corporate foreign competitiveness</p>	<p>“Increasing the level of productive investment in Europe is key to boosting demand and improving competitiveness and long-term growth potential in Europe.” (Council of the European Union 2015a, Guideline 1)</p>
<p>The strengthening of welfare and employment policies</p>	<p>“Ambitious implementation of structural reforms by Member States in both product and labour markets, social welfare and pension systems is crucial to strengthen and sustain the economic recovery and ensure sustainable public finances, improve competitiveness, prevent and correct harmful macroeconomic imbalances in line with the macroeconomic imbalance procedure, and increase the growth potential of the Union economies.” (Council of the European Union 2015a, Guideline 2) “Member States should facilitate the creation of quality jobs, reduce the barriers business faces in hiring people, promote entrepreneurship and, in particular, support the creation and growth of small enterprises. Member States should actively promote the social economy and foster social innovation.” (Council of the European Union 2015b, Annex 2, Guideline 5)</p>
<p>Transference to the private realm of corporate responsibilities</p>	<p>“Member States, in cooperation with social partners, should promote productivity and employability through an appropriate supply of relevant knowledge, skills and competences. Member States should make the necessary investment in all education and training systems in order to improve their effectiveness and efficiency in raising the skill and competences of the workforce, thereby allowing them to better anticipate and meet the rapidly changing needs of dynamic labour markets in an increasingly digital economy and in the context of technological, environmental and demographic change.” (Council of the European Union 2015b, Guideline 6)</p>
<p>Allocation of logistic support preferentially to private enterprise</p>	<p>“Efforts should continue to be made in order to improve the regulatory environment in which enterprises operate, to support in particular small and medium-sized enterprises, and should include modernization of public administration, a reduction in</p>

	administrative burdens, greater transparency, the fight against corruption, tax evasion and undeclared work, the improvement of the independence, quality and efficiency of judicial systems, alongside with contract enforcement and well-functioning insolvency procedures.” (Council of the European Union 2015a, Guideline 2)
Sound public financial policies and fair distribution of income	<p>“Sound public finances are key for growth and job creation. Member States should secure long-term control over the deficit and debt levels. Fiscal policies must be conducted within the Union rules-based framework, in particular, the Stability and Growth Pact, complemented by sound national budgetary arrangements.” (Council of the European Union 2015a, Guideline 4)</p> <p>“Expenditure reforms that promote efficient resource allocation to support growth and employment while preserving equity should be complemented by the modernization of revenue systems, where necessary.” (Council of the European Union 2015a, Guideline 4)</p>
<p>Sources: BRESSER-PEREIRA, L. C. (2006). “O Novo Desenvolvimentismo e a Ortodoxia Convencional.” <i>São Paulo em Perspetiva</i> 20 (3), pp. 5-24. CERVO, A.L. (2003): “Política Exterior e Relações Internacionais do Brasil.” <i>Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional</i> 46 (2), pp. 5-25. COUNCIL OF THE EU (2015a): “Council of the European Union. Council Decision (EU) 2015/1848 of 5 October 2015 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States for 2015.” Brussels. 15.10. 2015. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D1848&from=EN (accessed 16 January 2018). COUNCIL OF THE EU (2015b): “Council Recommendation (EU) 2015/1184 of 14 July 2015 on broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the European Union.” Brussels. 15.10.2015. Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC2020&from=EN (accessed 16 January 2018).</p>	

3.4. The logistic-state and new-developmental models and the Europe 2020 Strategy: the importance of post-Keynesianism approaches

Neoliberalism can be characterized as an “ideology” that considers that “free-market competition” constitutes the most effective and “rational” path to distribute resources” (David, 2018, p. xi). In this perspective, governmental intervention in the economy is represented as perverting free-trade, the agency of private entrepreneurs as well as the liberalization of capital movements

(David, 2008, p. xi). Neoliberalism is, therefore, in contradiction with the Keynesian model, which considers state intervention as an essential way to redress “market imbalances” (David, 2008, p. xi).

The distinctions between neoliberalism, Keynesian, and post-Keynesian perspectives are at the core of the European financial crisis (David, 2008). The sovereign debt crisis exposed the fragilities of European countries located at the periphery of the European economy and whose “financial instability” and “permanent deficit in productivity” lead to growing public deficits (Costa, 2018, p. 10). The European crisis, however, also demonstrated the structural problems of the “short-sighted EMU design” and a lack of European means to “correct” economic asymmetries between member-states (Costa 2018, p. 10). The EMU was established following the “New Consensus in Macro Economics” approach which can be depicted by two main features: the assumption that price stability is the core goal of monetary policy and the belief that inflation can be regulated through monetary policies that maintain rate interests under the control of central banks (Nachane, 2018).

It is in the context of a growing division between core and peripheral countries that the Europe 2020 Strategy should be understood. Arguing that the Europe 2020 Strategy represents the European Union and its member-states as logistic regulators concerning state-society relations should be assessed bearing in mind the need to correct structural European imbalances and to limit the negative externalities deriving from the adoption at an European level of the “New Consensus in Macro Economics” which conducted to financial market and labor market de-regulation (Hein et al. 2011, p. 20).

A close reading of the legal acts implementing the Europe 2020 Strategy demonstrates that the Strategy constitutes a deviation from “disciplinary neoliberalism” (Gill, 1998) and demonstrates affinities with post-Keynesian macro-economic policy. Post-Keynesianism can be characterized by the belief that “institutions matter” (Dequech, 2012, p. 357) and that the availability of capital is the key variable affecting productivity. From a political perspective, post-Keynesianism upholds solid state regulatory intervention (Dequech, 2012, p. 357). Such regulatory intervention is fundamental since, in post-Keynesianism thought, uncertainty is a central economic condition (Dequech, 2012, p. 357). A post-Keynesian macro-economic policy favors the prevention of undesirable “distribution effects” for both workers and corporations by allocating responsibility for constant inflation rates, economic stabilization, “full employment,” and equal income distribution to wage and fiscal policies (Lavoie, 2011, p. 27). In the “Communication from the Commission Europe 2020. A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth,” the European Commission (2010, p. 5) explicitly claims that the EU market economy has a particular social framework.

The social dimension of the European Union is a vital pillar of the European integration historical path (EC, 2017, p. 6). The European social model is in close articulation with the construction of the single market as well as with the development of European citizenship (EC, 2017, p. 6). The fundamental goals of the European social pillar remained the same since the 1950s when the Treaties of Rome defined as law the principle of “equal pay between women and men”: promoting better “working conditions, living standards and gender equality” (EC, 2017, p. 6).

It should be highlighted the importance that the “Council Recommendations” allocate to questions concerning aggregate demand and

its articulation with productivity as well as with the need to establish regulatory policies to decrease unemployment rates (Council of the European Union, 2015b). Those objectives are fundamentally associated with a post-Keynesian macro-economic policy (Dequech, 2012). The same goals are also at the core of the policy significance associated with assigning to the European Union and its member-states a logistic role concerning state-society relations based on the introduction of a regulatory mechanism to correct the negative externalities of the free-market and on the allocation of logistic support preferentially to private enterprises (Paula & Filho, 2010).

In Brasil, post-Keynesianism holds an atypical influential position on academic and economic thought (Dequech, 2012). As Dequech (2012, p. 361) argues, Brazil is a “sizeable exception” to the frail general influence of post-Keynesianism in the academic world. Keynesian thinking has, for decades, influenced Brazilian “economic thought” (Paula & Filho, 2010, p. 1). From the late 1990s and in the first decade of the 2000s, when neoliberal policies began to be questioned, post-Keynesianism empowered its influence on Brazilian economists (Paula & Filho, 2010, p. 1). In articulation with the logistic-state and new-developmental models, Keynesian thought has underpinned the need to surpass the national developmental model and to create an alternative to neoliberal policies based on the empowerment of the role of the state in the national economy (Paula & Filho, 2010). The perspective that Cervo (2003) classifies as the “logistic-state,” post-Keynesianism designates as the “necessary” state (Paula & Filho 2010, p. 4). Following post-Keynesian thought, the “necessary state” should be responsible for merging “sustained economic growth with social equity and macroeconomic stability,” by promoting growth, social policies and a stable “institutional” environment able to foster private investment (Paula & Filho,

2010, p. 5). It can, therefore, be argued that, like as occurred with the Europe 2020 Strategy, the logistic-state and the new-developmental models have suffered the influence of post-Keynesian thought (see Sukiennik, 2008, paragraph 4).

4. CONCLUSION

The concluding section will assess the policy significance associated with the discussion of the following research question: how can a relation of commensurability be established between the logistic-state model and the new-developmental model, developed by Brazilian authors (Cervo, 2003; Bresser-Pereira, 2006), and the Europe 2020 Strategy.

The conceptual affinity between the logistic-state model, the new-developmental model, and the Europe 2020 Strategy, that was demonstrated throughout the paper, highlights the commensurability between the two models and the European Strategy and reveals that such commensurability derives from the need to find new regulatory models able to constitute an answer to “radical liberalism” (Cervo, 2003, paragraph 75). Studies following as international comparative public policy approach may be a path to discuss those answers. The policy significance of analyzing how the Europe 2020 Strategy represents the European Union and its member-states as logistic regulators concerning state-society relations derives from the opportunity to question how it is possible to respond to “radical” and “disciplinary neoliberalism” through (i) the introduction of regulatory mechanisms to correct the negative externalities of the free-market, (ii) the transference to the private realm of corporate responsibilities, (iii) the allocation of logistic support to private enterprises, and (iv) the demonstration that it is possible to combine a robust regulatory governance apparatus with a strong and free-

market (Cervo, 2003, paragraph 75; Gill, 1998, p. 5). The policy relevance of establishing a principle of commensurability between the logistic state-model, the new-developmental model, and the Europe 2020 Strategy is also related to the fact that the models and the abovementioned Strategy are inspired by post-Keynesianism thinking (see Sukiennik, 2008, paragraph 4).

Further studies, also based on an international comparative public policy conceptual framework, should deepen the importance of post-Keynesianism for understanding how Latin-American and European economic policies can benefit from mutual policy learning processes.

REFERENCES

- Amann, E., Azzoni, C. (2018). Introduction. In E. Amann, C. Azzoni & W. Baer, (Eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Brazilian Economy* (pp. 1-16). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Becker, B. & Egler, C. (1992). *Brazil: A New Regional Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bresser-Pereira, L. C. (2006). O Novo Desenvolvimentismo e a Ortodoxia Convencional. *São Paulo em Perspetiva*, 20(3), 5-24.
- Bouin, O. (2018). The End of European Integration as We Know It: A Political Economy Analysis. In M. Castells & O. Bouin (Eds). *Europe's Crises* (pp. 11-48). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Boix, C. & Stokes, S. (2009). *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Börzel, T. (2003). Shaping and Taking EU Policies: Member-States responses to Europeanization. *Queen's Papers on Europeanisation*, nº 2/2003.
- Bugiato, C. & Berringer, T. (2012). Um debate sobre o Estado logístico, subimperialismo e imperialismo brasileiro. *Em Debate* (7), 28-44.
- Burgess, M. (2006). *Comparative Federalism. Theory and Practice*. Oxon: Routledge.

- Caldas, J.C. (2012). *The consequences of austerity policies in Portugal*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, August, *International Policy Analysis*. Retrieved from: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/idmoe/09311.pdf>.
- Duarte, M.A. & Pascariu, G. (2017). Prelims. In M.A. Duarte & G. Pascariu (Eds). *Core-periphery Patterns Across the European Union. Case-Studies and Lessons From Eastern and Southern Europe*. (pp. i-xxxv). United Kingdom: Emerald Publishing.
- Cervo, A.L. (2003). Política Exterior e Relações Internacionais do Brasil. *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 46(2), 5-25.
- Celi, G. & Ginzburg, A. (2018). *Crisis in the European Monetary Union: A Core-Periphery Perspective*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Costa, C. (2018). Portuguese Economy: How (Not) To Get Away with Financial Crisis and Economic Adjustment Programmes. In I. David (Ed.). *Crisis, Neoliberalism and Transformation. How Disciplinary Neoliberalism is changing Portugal* (pp. 3-24). Boulder, CO.: Lexington Books.
- Council of the European Union. (2015a). *Council Decision (EU) 2015/1848 of 5 October 2015 on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States for 2015*. Brussels: Council of the European Union 15.10. 2015. Retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015D1848&from=EN>.
- Council of the European Union. (2015b). *Council Recommendation (EU) 2015/1184 of 14 July 2015 on broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the European Union*. Brussels: Council of the European Union. 15.10.2015. Retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC2020&from=EN>.
- David, I. (2018). Introduction. In I. David (Ed.) *Crisis, Neoliberalism and Transformation. How Disciplinary Neoliberalism is changing Portugal* (pp. ix-xxv). Boulder, CO.: Lexington Books.
- De Paula, L. & Filho, F. (2010). The Spread of Keynesianism in Brazil: The Origins and Experience of the Brazilian Keynesian Association. *Intervention* (7), 248-255.
- Dequech, D. (2012). Post Keynesianism, Heterodoxy and Mainstream Economics. *Review of Political Economy*, 2(24), 353-368.

- Di Filippo, A. (2009). Latin-American Structuralism and Economic Theory. *CEPAL Review*, (98), 175-196.
- EC. European Commission (2010). *Communication from the Commission. Europe 2020. A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth*. COM(2010) 2020 final. Brussels: European Commission. 3.3.2010. Retrieved from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:EN:HTML>.
- EC. European Commission (2011). *A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions*. COM 2011.681 Final. Brussels: European Commission. 25.10.2011. Retrieved from : [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/com/com_com\(2011\)0681_/com_com\(2011\)0681_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/com/com_com(2011)0681_/com_com(2011)0681_en.pdf).
- EC. European Commission (2017). *Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe*. COM(2017). Brussels: European Commission. 26.04. 2017. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-social-dimension-europe_en.pdf.
- EU. European Union (2019). *Europe 2020 Strategy*. Policies, Information and Services. Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester/framework/europe-2020-strategy_en.
- Knill, C. & Lehmkuhl, D. (2002). *The National Impact of European Union Regulatory Policy: Three Europeanization Mechanisms*. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41(2), 255-280.
- Fedajev, A., Stanujkic, D., Brauers, W., Zavadskas, E. & Karabasevic, D. (2019). Assessment of Progress towards 'Europe 2020' strategy targets by Using the MULTIMOORA Method and the Shannon Entropy Index. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, (244), 118895.
- Gill, S. (2000). Towards a Post-Modern Prince? The Battle of Seattle as a Moment in the New Politics of Globalization. *Millennium. Journal of International Studies* 29 (1), 131-140.

- Gill, S. (1998). European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism. *New Political Economy* 3(1). 5-26.
- Griffin, J. (1997). Incommensurability: What's the Problem? In R. Chang (Ed.). *Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason* (pp. 35-51). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hueglin, T. & Fenna, A. (2015). *Comparative Federalism: A Systematic Inquiry*. Canada: University of Toronto Press.
- IMF (2018). International Monetary Fund. World Economic Outlook Database. *World Economic and Financial Surveys*. Retrieved from: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/index.aspx>.
- Kopstein, T., Lichbach, M. & Hanson, S. (2014). *Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities and Institutions in a Changing Global Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lavoie, M. (2011). History and Methods of post-Keynesian Economics. In E. Hein & E. Stockhammer (Ed.). *A Modern Guide to Keynesian Macroeconomics and Economic Policies* (pp. 1-34). USA: Edward Elgar.
- Lapavitsas, C., Kaltenbrunner, A., Lindo, D., Michell, J., Paineira, J.P., Pires, E., Powel, J., Stenfors, J. & Teles, N. (2012). Beggar Thyself and Thy Neighbour. In C. Lapavitsas (Ed.). *Crisis in the Eurozone* (pp. 1-74). London: Verso.
- Learneurope (2019). Learneurope. Educational open e-tools. *Models of Welfare State in Europe* Retrieved from <http://www.learneurope.eu/index.php?CID=300>.
- Machado, D. (2009): O Estado Logístico Brasileiro e a Crise Financeira Mundial. Motivos para Optimismo. *Meridiano* 47 (10), 1-10. Retrieved from: <http://www.ibri-rbpi.org/?p=12307>.
- Nachene, D.M. (2018) *Critique of the New Consensus Macroeconomics and Implications for India*. India: Springer.
- Olsen, J. P. (2002). The Many Faces of Europeanization. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(5), 921-952.

- Orvis, S. and C. Drogus (2018). *Introducing Comparative Politics. Concepts and Cases in Context*. California: Sage.
- Pearce, D. (1987). *Roads to Commensurability*. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- Rose, R. (2005). *Learning from Comparative Public Policy: A Practical Guide*. Oxon: Routledge, Rossler, M. (2013). *The Logic of Relativism*. S.L.: Increasingly Skeptical Publications.
- Sparke, M. (2013). *Introducing Globalization: Ties, Tension and Uneven Integration*. Malden:Wiley Blackwell.
- Statista. (2018). Unemployment rate in member-states of the European Union in June 2018. *The Statistics Portal*. Retrieved from: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/268830/unemployment-rate-in-eu-countries/>.
- Sukiennik, B.P. (2008). Estado Logístico. Contribuições das Relações Internacionais ao Direito. *E-Gov UFSC*. Retrieved from: www.egov.ufsc.br/portal/sites/default/files/anexos/22505-22507-1-PB.pdf
- Valdez, R. (2011). *A internacionalização do BNDES no governo Lula*. Dissertação (Mestrado em Relações Internacionais). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre.
- Wilder, M. (2017). Comparative Public Policy: Origins, Themes, New Directions. *Policy Studies Journal*, 45(51), 547-566.